We must wake up to the threats of new chemical weapons

Chemical warfare is centuries old, but rapid advances in science could create deadly new weapons. We must act now

SYRIA, AD 256: Persian forces are under siege by the Romans. The attacking forces seek to tunnel under the Persian fortifications, but are met by a toxic mix of fumes from burning sulphur and bitumen. Syria, 2013: as yet unsubstantiated claims and counterclaims abound that chemical weapons have been deployed in the country.

The abhorrent effects of chemical warfare were unequivocally demonstrated during the first world war. This year, we mark the 25th anniversary of the use of chemical weapons against civilians in Halabja in northern Iraq under Saddam Hussein's leadership.

Most governments now regard such weapons as militarily redundant, as demonstrated by their membership of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which prohibits the production and use of chemical weapons, commits them to destroying all existing stocks, and prevents reacquisition. Yet advances in a range of scientific fields ? such as neuroscience and nanotechnology ? and the growing convergence of chemistry and biology, while offering the hope of benefits to medicine and civil society, also bring the potential for a new era in chemical warfare.

There is an intrinsic connection between the military and civilian scientific communities; the military's need for innovation has long been a driving force in research. But the potential for the adaptation and exploitation of scientific discovery for military advantage has rarely been greater.

Pursuing legitimate research while minimising the risk of misuse is a challenge for all. In 2011, I wrote in this magazine that the world needed to do more to guard against the growing threat of biological weapons. Now, I want to make the same case with regard to chemical weapons.

These issues are being discussed this month at the Third Review Conference of the CWC at The Hague in the Netherlands. The UK was a key player in negotiating agreement for the convention, which came into force in 1997, and although the threats we now face are very different from those that preoccupied the original negotiators, our commitment to it is undiminished. It remains a fundamental part of the international legal framework to tackle the threat of chemical weapons and has resulted in the destruction of four-fifths of the world's declared stockpiles.

This is welcome, but we cannot afford to be complacent. The international community must ensure it is equipped to meet new challenges and prevent the re-emergence of chemical weapons.

The latest threat comes on several fronts. Consider the rapidly advancing field of neuroscience, in particular neuropharmacology. The potential benefits for treating neurological impairment, disease and psychiatric illness are immense; but so too are potentially harmful applications ? specifically the development of a new range of lethal, as well as incapacitating, chemical warfare agents. Nanotech also has the potential to transform medical care, but could be used to bolster chemical weapon capabilities.

We should not allow threats to hinder scientific progress. But we should do all we can to minimise the misuse of knowledge, materials, expertise and equipment for hostile purposes.

The scientific community must play its part. These issues should be a fundamental element of educational and professional training for scientists and engineers, along with clear guidance on the obligations imposed by the CWC to not develop, produce, acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons. Organisations such as the UK's Royal Society are spearheading this work.

Significant challenges to the convention are also being addressed. For instance, it focuses on the types and quantities of toxins that armies, not terrorist cells, would need. The components of chemical weapons are readily available: industrial chemicals are sold in bulk, yet unlike their nuclear equivalent, only limited scientific and engineering knowledge is needed to turn them against us.

Recent history shows us that extremists entertain no qualms about the acquisition and use of such weapons; and they are willing to use primitive delivery systems. In 1995, terrorists from the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo released a nerve agent on the Tokyo subway which led to 13 deaths and left hundreds more suffering ill effects.

Preventing and prohibiting misuse without impeding the beneficial development of science and technology is a delicate balancing act but a necessary one. All nations must face up to these challenges and consider the implications for the CWC's verification regime in the short, near and long term. For instance, will the declaration and inspection provisions that apply to the chemical industry still be relevant? We cannot afford to be reactive. If unchecked, this threat has the potential to cause devastation on a vast scale.

This is a watershed moment for the convention and for the international community. We must summon the political will to strengthen regulation and ensure relevance in the modern world. The duty to prevent chemical development for weapons must be enforced in all nations, and states must be prepared to take steps nationally to prevent the misuse of toxic chemicals.

As the current situation in Syria demonstrates, the danger posed by these weapons is not an abstract issue. The existence of that country's chemical arsenal is a reminder of the threats we face.

Any use of such weapons is abhorrent. Preventing this and holding to account those who use them must remain a priority for the international and scientific communities alike.

Alistair Burt is a Conservative party member of parliament and parliamentary under-secretary of state at the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office. His responsibilities include counterproliferation efforts

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